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S054868
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
KHALID KHAWAR,

)
)

Plaintiff and Respondent, )
)

V-

)
)

GLOBE INTERNATIONAL, INC.

)
)

Defendant and Petitioner. )
)

--------------------------------- )

PETITIONER'S BRIEF ON THE MERITS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Preliminary Statement
On August 31, 1989, Respondent Khalid Khawar brought suit
against Globe International, Inc.

(Globe), Roundtable Publishing

(Roundtable), and Robert Morrow (Morrow), in Los Angeles Superior
Court, alleging defamation.
Cal.Rptr 2d 92,

98(1996).

See Khawar v. Globe Int'l. Inc.. 54
Ali Ahmad, Respondent's father, also

filed a defamation suit against the same defendants on November
29, 1989, in the same court.

See id.

The trial court

consolidated Respondent's and Ahmad's actions on September 16,
1991.

id.i.

In advance of trial, both Respondent and Ahmad

reached a settlement with Roundtable and Morrow.
A jury trial commenced on March 1, 1994.

See id.

(C.T. 2687.)

The

trial court ordered the jury to return two advisory verdicts
pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 592.
(C.T. 2780, 2790.)

On March 10, 1994, the court granted Globe's

Motion for Nonsuit with respect to Ahmad.

(C.T. 2694.)

At the

conclusion of the trial between Respondent and Globe, the jury
1

found for the Respondent, and awarded compensatory and punitive
damages in the amount of $1,175,000.

(C.T. 2783, 2791.)

The

trial court nullified the jury's finding that the article was
neutral and accurate reportage.

(C.T. 2752-53.)

Globe filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the April 15,
1994 judgment and the Court of Appeal for the Second District
granted review.

See Khawar, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99.

The Court

of Appeal affirmed the judgment against Globe on June 5, 1996.
See id. at 92.

This Court granted certiorari to review this

matter on September 25, 1996.

§eg

Statement of Facts
On June 4, 1968, United States Senator Robert Kennedy was
assassinated at a campaign appearance in Los Angeles, California.
(R.T. 1338.)

Respondent was positioned in close proximity to

Senator Kennedy on a podium at this event.

(R.T. 1339.)

Photographs and motion picture footage recorded Respondent
standing on the podium near the Senator.

(R.T. 1345-47.)

The

photographs and footage received worldwide attention, and one
photograph appeared on the cover of Time magazine.
93.)

(R.T. 1391-

Respondent knew of this publicity, and kept a copy of the

magazine.

(R.T. 1392.)

Television broadcasters broadcast some

of the motion picture footage at least once a year through the

’ At the trial's conclusion the jury found: (1) the article was a
neutral and accurate report of the statements contained in Mr.
Morrow's book; (2) Respondent was a private figure; (3) Globe
published its article negligently and either with knowledge that the
statements in the article were false or with reckless disregard to
the veracity of those statements; and (4) Globe published the article
with malice or oppression. (C.T. 2782-83.)

2

time of the trial.

(R.T. 1393.)

The day following the

assassination, Respondent tried to sell his own photographs of
the evening's events to Life magazine.

See id.

Law enforcement

officials and the Federal Bureau of Investigation questioned
Respondent several times following the assassination.

(R.T.

1351.)
In November 1988, Morrow, an author, wrote The Senator Must
Dig, a book proposing that Senator Kennedy's death was part of a
conspiracy involving professional crime organizations and SAVAK,
the Iranian secret police.(C.T. 3145.)

In his book, Mr.

Morrow suggested that the true assassin was not Sirhan Sirhan,
who was ultimately convicted of the assassination, but instead a
foreign agent named Ali Ahmand.

(R.T. 1096-97.)

The book

contained photographs depicting Respondent on the podium with
Senator Kennedy, with captions identifying Respondent as Ali
Ahmand.

(R.T. 156.)

In the April 4, 1989 issue of The Globe. John Blac)dDurn, a
reporter employed by Globe, wrote an article reporting on The
gen^tpr Must Dig.

(R.T. 1089.)

To gather background material

for his article, Mr. Blackburn read Morrow's book and conducted
an in-depth interview of the author.

(R.T. 1093, 1101.)

The

article reported Morrow's allegations, attributing them to him
more than a dozen times, and quoted from his book in several

Mr. Morrow authored a first book. Betrayal. an account of President
John F. Kennedy's assassination.
(R.T. 841.) Morrow published this
book in 1974, and the book was the impetus for Congressman Tomas
Downing's establishment of the House Select Committee on
Assassinations.
(R.T. 842-43.)

3

places.

(R.T. 1090-93.)

With the article, Globe printed two

photographs, one of them reproduced from the book.
R.T. 2742-43.)

(C.T. 3145

This photograph showed Senator Kennedy at the

podium with Respondent (who was indicated by an added graphic
pointer) seen in the background.

(C.T. 3145.)

The article

identified the person in the photograph as Ali Ahmand.

4

S^e id

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.

Whether Respondent's affirmative efforts to link himself
with a public controversy, or events beyond Respondent's
immediate control drawing him into a public controversy,
rendered Respondent a limited-purpose public figure.

II.

Whether publication of an article about a nationally
distributed book, combined with unsuccessful efforts to
locate the subject of the book, constitutes actual malice.

III. Whether California should protect the free press by adopting
a neutral reportage privilege as applied to Globe
International's neutral and accurate report on a
controversial book.

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Respondent is a limited-purpose public figure with respect
to the June 4, 1968 assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy.

He

took various voluntary, affirmative steps before and after the
assassination to associate himself publicly with the that event.
These acts included seeking and obtaining a position adjacent to
the Senator on the evening of the assassination under the glare
of publicity and intense public scrutiny; attempting to sell his
own pictures of the event; and in the years following the
assassination, publicly identifying himself with Senator Kennedy.
Thus, Respondent is a voluntary limited-purpose public figure.
Even if Respondent's actions do not render him a voluntary
limited-purpose public figure, photographs and video broadcasts
continue to portray him in association with Senator Kennedy
nearly 30 years after the assassination.

Several books have

identified Respondent as a possible assassin of the Senator.
Thus Respondent is at least an involuntary public figure with
regard to this controversy of continued public interest.
Actual malice in the context of defamation is a demanding
standard, requiring knowledge of a statement's falsity or a
reckless disregard for the truth.

Respondent has not

demonstrated that Globe acted with actual malice.

Accordingly,

this Court must reverse the trial court's award of punitive
damages.

Globe placed its faith in reliable sources and efforts

to contact Respondent.

The article it published reported on a

book by a best-selling author.

An earlier book by the same

author spurred Congress into conducting hearings to investigate

6

his allegations regarding another assassination.

Thus, Globe did

not display the requisite knowledge of, or reckless disregard
for, falsity in the article it published.
To avoid chilling free speech and debate, and to help
reporters and editors predict the boundaries of liability, this
Court should adopt the neutral reportage privilege to cover
republication of credible sources' allegations regarding
newsworthy controversies.

The privilege would enable courts and

editors alike to avoid the complex and difficult determination of
a subject's status as public or private.

The circumstances of

this case illustrate the need for a new standard enabling
journalists to avoid liability for defamation and libel.
Excessive zeal in protecting individual privacy chills free
speech and debate on public issues by forcing editors to err on
the side of caution and self-censorship.

By recognizing such a

limited privilege, this Court would both shield Globe in the
present case and protect other publishers that, in good faith,
republish reliable sources' allegations.

State and federal

courts in California and elsewhere have recognized that
preserving a free press requires shielding accurate reports of
allegations under a neutral reportage privilege.
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD CONDUCT AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE
ISSUES ON APPEAL.
The appropriate standard of review for cases involving libel

is ds novo review.

See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union. 466 U.S.

485, 510-11 (1984); McCoy v. Hearst Corp.. 42 Cal, 3d 835, 842
(1986).

In McCoy. this Court cited Bose for the proposition that
7

independent review is necessary to protect constitutional
liberties because only clear and convincing evidence may overcome
First Amendment protections.

42 Cal. 3d at 842.

A trial court's decision regarding a plaintiff's limited
public figure status for defamation purposes is a mixed question
of law and fact.
933 (1994) .

Penney v. Lawrence. 22 Cal. App. 4th 927,

The standard of review of such a trial court

determination "is whether, after an independent review of the
entire record, substantial evidence supports the trial court s
decision."

Id.; see also McCov. 42 Cal. 3d 835 at 842.

Whether a jurisdiction has adopted a rule or privilege are
questions of law, which this Court reviews independently.

Sge

Cocker Nat' 1 Bank v. City and County of San Francisc_o, 49 Cal. 3d
881, 888 (1989).
Questions of law relate to the selection of a rule;
their resolution is reviewed independently. Mixed
questions of law and fact concern the application of
the rule to the facts and the consequent determination
whether the rule is satisfied.
If the pertinent
question involves the experience with human affairs,
the question is predominantly factual and its
determination is reviewed under the substantial
evidence test.
If, by contrast, the inquiry requires a
critical consideration in a factual context, of legal
principles and their underlying values, the question is
predominantly legal and its determination is reviewed
independently.
Id.
In the present case, this Court is asked to adopt a new rule
of law.

The new elements must be applied in a critical context

considering the underlying legal principles.
Independent review is therefore proper.

8

gee iiL.

II.

BOTH RESPONDENT'S AFFIRMATIVE ACTS AND EVENTS BEYOND HIS
IMMEDIATE CONTROL RENDERED HIM A LIMITED-PURPOSE PUBLIC
FIGURE FOR DEFAMATION PURPOSES.
American courts have long required public officials and

public figures to prove actual malice to prevail in an action for
defamation relating to their public status.

See New York Times

Cq_;_3L:_Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)

(regarding public

officials); Curtis Publ'a Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v.
Walker. 388 U.S. 130 (1967)

(extending the New York Times rule to

all public figures).
Courts have identified two classes of public figures:

all

purpose public figures, and limited-purpose public figures.
Gertz

V.

Robert Welch. Inc.. 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974).

See

An all

purpose public figure is one of "such pervasive fame or notoriety
that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all
contexts."

Xd.

Conversely, a limited-purpose public figure

"voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public
controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited
range of issues."

Id.

(emphasis added).

While private figures

generally enjoy broad protections against defamation, courts
usually afford limited-purpose public figures less protection
insofar as "the allegedly defamatory communication relates to
[their] role in a public controversy."

Reader's Digest Ass'n v.

Superior Court. 37 Cal. 3d 244, 253-54 (1984).
Courts have declined to fashion a bright-line test for when
an individual achieves limited-purpose public figure status.
Courts have, however, ruled that an individual does not acquire
that status merely by being a criminal defendant (see Wolston v.

9

Reader’s Digest: Ass’n. 443 U.S. 157, 168 (1979)), or by seeking
relief through the courts in a matter that has drawn public
attention.

Time. Inc - v- Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 457

(1976) .
A,

Respondent Pursued a Prominent Position in the Publig
Controversies of Senator Kennedy's Campaign and
Assassination.
1.

Respondent's affirmative efforts—gafisfy the
requirement of seeking a prominent—role—in a
public controversy.

In determining whether an individual is a private or a
limited-purpose public figure, this Court has noted that "courts
should look for evidence of affirmative actions by which

public

figures' have thrust themselves into the forefront of particular
public controversies."

Reader's Digest, 37 Cal. 3d at 254-55.

In that case, this Court ruled that the Synanon Church and its
founder had become public figures through "their myriad attempts
to thrust their case and Synanon in general into the public eye,"
rather than accepting the plaintiffs'

"own statements regarding

their public visibility and reputation."

Id^ at 255.

Respondent's efforts at self-promotion and connection with
Senator Kennedy's assassination do not rise to the level of
Synanon's attempts, which included publicity campaigns;
solicitation of favorable books, newspaper articles, and a motion
picture; and alleged intimidation of critics.

See id.

Respondent's efforts do, however, constitute "thrust [ing]
[himself] into the forefront of [a] particular public
controvers[y]," id.. sufficient to render him a limited-purpose
public figure.

10

Respondent so thrust himself by many actions, beginning when
he actively sought a position on the podium in a hotel ballroom
next to Senator Kennedy during the Senator's nationally televised
primary victory speech.

{R.T. 1339.)

Respondent's own position

as a freelance photographer for a Pakistani publication
demonstrated the worldwide attention focused on Senator Kennedy's
campaign.

(R.T. 1389.)

Respondent, as a member of the press,

knew that millions of people worldwide would see anyone on the
podium via broadcasts and photographs.

(R.T. 1391.)

In fact,

Respondent specifically wanted to be seen and photographed next
to Senator Kennedy.

(R.T. 1340.)

The affirmative act of

positioning himself on the stage was his first and most literal
effort to "thrust [himself] into the forefront" of an entirely
public affair.

(R.T. 1339.)

On the day following the assassination, Respondent continued
to pursue a public role in this controversy.

(R.T. 1393.)

He

sought to sell his photographs of Senator Kennedy's final speech,
and of the pandemonium following the assassination, to Life
magazine.

(R.T. 1393.)

photographs, pictures
ot

Qf_

Though unsuccessful in selling these
Respondent (including one on the cover

Time magazine) entered the national consciousness via

televised and published reports of Senator Kennedy's last few
minutes.

(R.T. 1392-93.)

Since that time. Respondent has continued to publicly
associate himself with the Kennedy assassination.

(R.T. 1358.)

In his office. Respondent prominently displayed a picture of
himself on the podium with the Senator,

11

Respondent admitted that

hundreds of people viewed this photograph each year.
59.)

(R.T. 1357-

This demonstrates that Respondent connected himself in the

public eye with the Kennedy assassination, especially within his
community of Bakersfield.

By actively encouraging this

association. Respondent maintained his involvement in a long
standing public interest in Senator Kennedy's death.
2.

Recognizing Respondent's public-ficrure status is
consistent with the policies underlying the
distinction between public and private figures.

Respondent has demonstrated at least a modicum of access to
the media, addressing the Gertz concern for "greater access to
the channels of effective communication" enabling the victim to
mitigate the defamation's impact on reputation.
at 344.

G^rtz, 418 U.S.

In Gertz. this factor is apparently a rationale for the

public-private distinction, rather than an element in
establishing public-figure status.

See Harris v. Tomczak, 94

F.R.D, 687, 699-700 (E.D. Cal. 1992).
After filing this lawsuit, Respondent broadcast on local
television a response to Morrow's book, the Globe article, and
other accusations.

(R.T. 1368-70.)

This enabled Respondent to

mitigate the impact any defamation had on his reputation.
Respondent claims reputational damage, presumably primarily in
the area where he lived and was widely known, Bakersfield,
California.

(R.T. 1356-59.)

He responded in that area through

local television, a medium that probably reached more viewers
than did the Globe article.^

The issue containing that article

" Respondent may thus have actually increased the number of people
aware of the accusations.
12

sold only 1,800 copies in Bakersfield.

(R.T. 1862.)

Thus,

Respondent was able to substantially counteract the Globe
article's statements within the area where he was most concerned
about injury, presumably mitigating his damages.

Most important,

he showed that he satisfied the Gertz court's media-access
rationale for the public-private distinction.
The United States Supreme Court has given weight to pre
lawsuit requests by plaintiffs that their alleged defamers print
a retraction.

See, e.Q.. Hutchinson v. Proxmire. 443 U.S. Ill,

118 n.6 (1979); Time Inc, v. Firestone. 424 U.S, 448, 452 (1976).
California similarly encourages such mitigation.
§ 48 (West 1986).

Cal. Civ. Code

Nothing in the record indicates that

Respondent ever asked Globe to retract its article, or that he
asked for room to respond.

If he had asked and Globe had

acceded, the retraction would have reached substantially the same
audience as saw the initial article.
®•

Respondent Became an Involuntary Limited-Purpose Public
Figure After Senator Kennedy's Assassination.

At least one court has held that an individual became an
involuntary limited-purpose public figure because he played a
sufficiently central role in a public controversy, and the
alleged defamation was germane to his involvement.
V.

See Dameron

Washington Magazine. Inc.. 779 F.2d 736, 741-43 (D.C. Cir.

1985) .

Dameron, an air traffic controller, sued a publisher over

a sidebar in an article on airport safety.

See id. at 737-38.

The sidebar concerned crashes in which air traffic control
problems were implicated; it erroneously suggested that the

13

controllers in a crash that occurred on Dameron's watch may have
been at fault.

£££ icL. at 738.

After that crash, Dameron

appeared and testified repeatedly at public hearings into the
*

crash.

ipjjg pameron court applied a three-part analysis, finding
that an airplane crash generating extensive public hearings was a
sufficient public controversy, that the alleged defamation (which
did not identify plaintiff by name) related to that controversy,
and that Dameron himslf played a sufficiently central role in the
controversy.

at 741-43.

The latter prong of the test

ordinarily examines voluntary acts of the plaintiff.
741.

id^ at

The court modified this prong to examine whether the

plaintiff's "relatively passive involvement in this controversy
suffices" to render him a public figure.

Id.

Factors the court

weighed in determining his status included his repeated
appearance in public hearings and the past use of his likeness in
reports on the event.

id__ at 742.

The court observed that

"[b]y sheer bad luck, Dameron happened to be the controller on
duty at the time of the .

.

. crash.

He became embroiled,

through no desire of his own, in the ensuing controversy over the
causes of the accident."

Id.

In the instant case, the "public controversy" prong of the
Dameron test is clearly satisfied.

The assassination of a

probable presidential candidate, immediately after winning a
crucial primary, attacks the political process,- it is difficult
to imagine a more "public" or "controversial" event.
the test's "germane" prong is satisfied:

14

Likewise,

the allegations

regarding Respondent arose from his presence on the podium next
to Senator Kennedy immediately before the assassination.

Thus,

as in D^mgrpn. Respondent's public-figure status depends on
whether he played a sufficiently central role.
Respondent has been publicly associated with Senator
Kennedy's assassination ever since its occurrence, and thus has
been drawn into and become a part of the controversy.

As in

p^meron, Respondent's likeness has appeared in depictions of the
press conference broadcast annually on the anniversary of the
assassination.

(R.T. 1391-93.)

Even before the assassination,

and repeatedly ever since. Respondent's image has entered and re
entered the public consciousness in connection with Senator
Kennedy via the famous photographs and video footage from that
night.

(R.T. 1389-90.)

Many of these photographs were

distributed worldwide in print and broadcast media.
93.)

(R.T. 1391-

Respondent admitted that he openly displayed one picture

showing himself with Kennedy the night of the assassination.
(R.T. 1357-59.)

Respondent also admitted to being aware of

annual broadcasts showing him identifiably adjacent to Kennedy on
the podium.

(R.T. 1391-93.)

These public displays reinforce the

linkage Respondent created between himself and the assassination.
As early as 1970, only two years after Senator Kennedy's
assassination, Robert Blair Kaiser published RFK Must Die, a book
about the assassination that pointedly described Respondent as
All Ahmand and questioned his role in events that evening.
2167-69.)

(R.T.

Similarly, Morrow's book and others perpetuated the

vortex of events drawing Respondent deeper into the controversy.
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(R.T. 1605.)

Thus, both before and after the assassination,

events arising from it and beyond Respondent's control have drawn
Respondent in.

Therefore, Respondent had become at least an

involuntary limited-purpose public figure with regard to the
assassination of Senator Kennedy.
These broadcasts and publications between the dates of the
assassination and of Globe's article form a continuous public
chain of identification linking Respondent to Senator Kennedy and
his death.

However, such a chain is redundant because "once a

man has become a public figure ... he remains a matter of
legitimate recall to the public mind to the end of his days."
Forsher v. Bualiosi. 26 Cal. 3d 792, 811 (1980).

This is so even

though "[Respondent's] prominence may have diminished in the
intervening years, and he is no longer a close associate of
a .

.

. public figure."

662, 675 (1988).

Maheu v. CBS. Inc.. 201 Cal. App. 3d

Respondent therefore was at the time of

publication, and remains throughout his life, a public figure
with regard to this controversy.
III. EVEN IF THIS COURT FINDS THAT RESPONDENT IS A PRIVATE
FIGURE, IT MAY STILL REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF
PUNITIVE DAMAGES BECAUSE GLOBE DID NOT DISPLAY ACTUAL
MALICE.
Private plaintiffs alleging defamation must prove either
"knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth" by the
defendant in order to qualify for punitive damages.
418 U.S. at 349.

See Ge^fz,

Such actual malice is not readily and

universally definable, and courts analyze each case individually.
See St. Amant v. Thompson. 390 U.S. 727, 730 (1968); Harte~Hanks
Communications v. Connauahton. 491 U.S. 657, 686 (1989) .
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Malice

in this context is a subjective standard, in which the state of
mind of the defendant is at issue.

See St. Amant. 390 U.S. at

730-31.
In California, a finding of actual malice requires "that the
defendant in fact entertained serious doubt as to the truth of
his publication.

Publishing with such doubts shows reckless

disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice."
Antonovich v. Superior Court. 234 Cal. App. 3d 1041, 1048 (1991).
A.

Respondent Cannot Satisfy this Court's Test for Finding
Actual Malice.

This Court has set forth the factors relevant in determining
circumstantially whether a defamation defendant acted with actual
malice.

S^e Reader's Digest Ass'n. 37 Cal. 3d at 257-58.

factors are evidence of (1) negligence,

These

(2) motive and intent,

(3) anger and hostility toward the plaintiff, and (4) reliance on
sources known to be either unreliable or biased against the
plaintiff,

gee id.

These factors may be used "by cumulation and

by appropriate inferences" to establish recklessness regarding,
or knowledge of, falsity.

Id. at 257.

Therefore, no one factor,

even if plainly present, conclusively demonstrates the requisite
mental state for a finding of actual malice.
Respondent alleges that Globe was negligent and that it used
an unreliable source.

However, the other factors - motive,

intent, anger and hostility toward the plaintiff, and reliance on
sources known to be biased against the plaintiff - are
uncontestedly absent.

Thus, Respondent must prove recklessness

or knowledge of falsity by 'cumulating' negligence with the use
of an unreliable source.
17
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Digest court .then indicated what kinds of

characteristics make a source unreliable, referring to Cyrtis
Co

V- Butts. 388 U.S. 130 (1967)

(uncorroborated reliance

on a source on criminal probation claiming to have overheard a
telephone call) and Pgp v. Newgwggk, Ing^, 553 P. Supp. 1000
(S D N.y. 1983)

(reliance on a reputed liar, swindler, and

compulsive gambler).

Reader's Digest. 37 Cal. 3d at 259 n.lO.

This analysis demonstrates skepticism toward reliance on sources
of plainly doubtful veracity.
In the instant case, no serious aspersions upon Morrow were
known to Globe.

No facts in the record suggest that he was on

criminal probation, or had a known reputation as a liar,
swindler, or gambler.

To the contrary, the seriousness with

which Congress regarded his allegations in the earlier book
Rptraval suggests that, especially regarding assassination
theories. Morrow was a prominent and reliable source.
B.

Failure to Investigate Is Not Reckless.. Conduct. and
Globe Performed a Reasonable Investigation in These
Circumstances.

Mere failure to investigate does not, by itself, support a
finding of actual malice.
1048.

S££ Antonovich. 234 Cal. App. 3d at

"[R]eckless conduct is not measured by whether a

reasonably prudent [person] would have published, or would have
investigated before publishing."

IsL.

This Court has likewise

stated that "tt]he failure to conduct a thorough and objective
investigation, standing alone, does not prove malice, nor even
necessarily raise a triable issue of fact on that controversy."
Reader's Digest Ass'n. 37 Cal. 3d at 258.

10

New Yprk TiiT\gg Court held that no actual malice existed
despite a publisher's failure to attempt to check statements in
its editorial advertisement against either its own internal
records or external sources, which would have shown several
allegations to be inaccurate.

376 U.S. at 261.

In that case,

the manager responsible for such investigations perceived no
evident falsehoods in the advertisement, and relied on the
endorsement of people whose reputation he "had no reason to
question."

Id, at 260-61.

In fact, those so-called endorsers

had not authorized such a use of their names.

See id. at 260.

In the instant case, publisher Globe likewise relied on the
investigative work of its reporter.

Blackburn indicated he

attempted to confirm the story with Respondent, but was unable to
locate him.

(R.T. 1121-23.)

Globe's failure to reach Respondent

must be viewed in light of the mystery surrounding his true name,
created by his use of inconsistent names that misled police and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(R.T. 1382-83.)

A campaign

worker compounded the confusion by identifying him as Ali Ahmad.
(R.T. 1383.)

Globe thus made greater efforts to confirm its

article's truth and accuracy than did the publisher in New York
Times.

Therefore, Globe's publication should be accorded no less

protection than that afforded the New York Times publisher.
In addition. Globe could reasonably have relied on the
research Morrow conducted in the course of preparing his book.
Morrow was already the best-selling author of another book
postulating a conspiracy in the death of President John F.
Kennedy.

(R.T. 841.)

This prior book was sufficiently
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convincing to persuade the Senate to initiate renewed hearings
into that assassination.

(R.T. 842-43.)

Globe was thus relying

on substantial, credible authority in publishing its story, and
its failure to investigate further does not show "reckless
disregard for the truth," let alone actual knowledge of falsity.
As Globe's reliance on its sources was in fact reasonable
and its sources were not known to Globe to be unreliable, and as
failure to investigate in such circumstances is reasonable under
New York Times. Respondent seeks to maintain punitive damages
without demonstrating recklessness or actual malice.

Therefore,

this Court should overturn the award of these damages.
C. The Allegations Made in Morrow’s Book Were Themselves
Newsworthy. Justifying Globe's Decision to Publish .a
Story About Them.
Because Morrow was a prominent and authoritative source with
significant credentials regarding assassination theories, Globe
was justified in treating his book, and its claims about
Respondent, as news.

Morrow's prior bestselling book, which

received public attention and motivated a congressional
investigation, established him as a prominent figure in the arena
of investigating assassinations of political figures.

(R.T. 841-

43.)
Globe's freedom to report on newsworthy events, such as
these allegations about a critical event in modern political
history, goes to the heart of the First Amendment.

Denying Globe

the right to bring such allegations to its readers' attention
would infringe on the public's right of access to important ideas
regarding the events that shape our nation.

20

Imposing actual-

malice damages in such circumstances is inconsistent with our
expectations regarding the function of a free press.
IV.

CALIFORNIA SHOULD RECOGNIZE A NEUTRAL REPORTAGE PRIVILEGE
THAT PRECLUDES FINDING GLOBE LIABLE FOR ITS REPORT OF
ANOTHER'S ALLEGATIONS.
California courts should actively protect the First

Amendment guarantee of a free press and recognize the neutral
reportage privilege.

Several other jurisdictions and lower

California courts have protected the press by adopting a neutral
reportage privilege.

Recognition of this privilege is consistent

with the recent Supreme Court holdings.

The strong interest in

protecting freedom of the press necessitates applying the
privilege to all citizens, public and private.

Yet if the

privilege relates solely to either private or public figures, the
result in the present case is the same:

Globe is privileged

because it accurately conveyed allegations of a prominent source.
Both Historical and Modern Interpretation of the First
Amendment Mandate Broad Protection of the Free Press.
The present question presented to this Court requires
determining if the press is protected by a neutral reportage
privilege.

A historically high protection of the press provides

context for this determination.

Our nation's founders espoused a

broad protection for the freedom of the press.
376 U.S. at 269-70.

New York Times.

Both James Madison and Thomas Jefferson

realized both that democracy required the information that a free
press provides and that having a free press required accepting
some mistakes and false reporting.

See 8 The Works of Thomas

Jeffetgpn 464-65 (Ford ed. 1904); 4 Elliot's Debates on the
Federal Constitution 571 (1876).
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Jurists also realized that a

failure to protect the press would likely end this nation's
experiment with democracy.

Judge Learned Hand and Justice

Brandeis both reasoned that democracy will fail and tyrannies
rise if the nation abandons its protections of the press.

See

TTirifed P^ar■es v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y.
1943);

Whitney v. California. 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927).

The United States Supreme Court, operating in the context of
these powerful policy prerogatives, has held that the First
Amendment protects the press even on occasions when the press
publishes libelous statements.
254.

See New York Times. 736 U.S. at

The New York Times Court determined whether to sanction the

press for publishing untrue allegations of misconduct of public
figures.

736 U.S. at 269.

In refusing to find a newspaper

liable for republishing libelous accusations, the Court held that
certain false speech must be tolerated to prevent chilling free
press and promoting self-censorship.

See id. at 279.

In order

to maintain vigorous discourse on the conduct of officials, the
Court protected the publication of defamatory statements
concerning public figures unless the defamed proved actual
malice.

See id. at 280-81.

The United States Supreme Court in

St. Amant later defined the requirements of actual malice.

390

U.S. 727.
The Supreme Court ratified this protection of the press in
Gertz. 418 U.S. at 341, reasoning that "[t]he First Amendment
requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect
speech that matters."

The Gertz Court held that actual malice

must be shown before liability may attach.
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Id.

For private

individuals, the Court held that "so long as they do not impose
liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the
appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster
of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual."
at 347.

Some courts interpret St. Amant as extending a certain

standard of protection from libel to private figures.
V.

Id.

CBS Inc.. 583 F.2d 1221, 1225 (3d Cir. 1978).

See Dickey

However, the

subsequent Gertz decision recognizes states' responsibility to
determine a standard of liability for private individuals.
U.S. at 347.
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This Court should now, consistent with the spirit

of these holdings, protect public discourse by adopting a neutral
reportage privilege.
B.

A Neutral Reportage Privilege Should Be Recognized to
Further the Policy of First Amendment Free Press
Protections.

This Court must determine whether Globe is privileged to
republish the allegations of a noted author.

Other courts have

faced similar issues in determining how to ensure a free press
and inform the public.

See, e.g.. Barry v. Time. Inc.. 583 F.

Supp. 1221 (N.D. Cal. 1984)

(privilege applied, covering

republished allegations aibout a public figure) .

Recognizing the

crucial nature of a free press to a democracy, other
jurisdictions extend protection from libel to the press for
neutral reports on a controversy.
1.

See id.

Federal and state courts in other jurisdictions
protect freedom of the press by adopting the
neutral reportage privilege.

The Second Circuit first recognized the privilege of neutral
reportage in Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y. Inc.. 556 F.2d

23

113 (2d Cir. 1977),

In that case, the court decided that the

right to a free press protected publication of a prominent
source's untrue accusations about a public controversy.

i^

at 120. NEW YORK TIMES published an article reporting the charges
issued by an Audubon Society researcher alleging that certain
scientists were "paid liars."

Id-

116-17,

In overturning the

libel judgment against the Times, the Edw^rOg court held that
"when a responsible, prominent organization .

.

- makes serious

charges against a public figure, the First Amendment protects the
accurate and disinterested reporting of those charges, regardless
of the reporter's private views regarding their validity.
at

120.

The trend in other jurisdictions is to recognize the
necessity of the neutral reportage privilege for protecting the
free press.
1997)

See Coliniatis v. Dimas, 965 F. Supp. 511 (S.D.N.Y.

(privilege precluded libel liability against newspaper that

reported an airline's allegations of employee corruption); Gist
V.

Macon County Sheriff's Dep't. 671 N.E.2d 1154 (Ill. App. 1996)

(privilege precluded defamation judgment against newspaper and
broadcaster who reported charges shown on a "most wanted
fugitives" flyer); Price v. Viking Pencniin, Inc.. 881 F.2d 1426
(8th Cir. 1989)

(holding report on F.B.I. agents conduct during

shootout at an indian reservation privileged); Herron v._Tribune
Publ'Q Co.. 736 P.2d 249 (Wash. 1987)

(privilege prevents libel

liability against newspaper that reports information in recall
petition).

These courts have also held that the privilege is

consistent with the United States Supreme Court holdings and

24

mandated by the policy of protection of the press found in
Supreme Court decisions.

See, e.a.. Edwards. 556 F.2d at 120;

Barry. 584 F. Supp. at 1123.
The trend toward adoption of the privilege has not been
unanimous, however.

The Third Circuit, relying principally on

its own interpretation of St. Amant. rejected adoption of the
neutral reportage privilege.

See Dickey. 583 F.2d at 1225.

In

rejecting the privilege, the Third Circuit misconstrued the St.
Amant decision.

St. Amant merely defines actual malice as a

reckless disregard for the truth.
727.

See St. Amant. 390 U.S. at

This case plainly does not require that every finding of

actual malice result in a libel judgment.

If this interpretation

by the Third Circuit were accurate, the First Amendment
protection of the press would be transformed into a doctrine that
compels states to find libel every time actual malice is found.
This interpretation is contrary to the very purpose of the Bill
of Rights, to limit the government actions by establishing basic
rights.

This interpretation also is contrary to subsequent

United States Supreme Court decisions.
U.S. 323.

See. e.Q.. Gertz. 418

The Supreme Court specifically held that states define

the standards for determining libel liability in relation to
private figures.

See id.

at 347.

Given this later ruling, the

Dickey rejection of the neutral reportage privilege bears little
weight.
The Third Circuit rejected the neutral reportage doctrine
without discussing its merits.
at 1225.

See, e.o.. Dickey. 583 F.2d 1221

While such a narrow focus on United States Supreme
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Court rulings might be appropriate for federal courts, this Court
is informed by a broader perspective.

The privilege should be

considered in light of the California Constitution, statutes,
court decisions, and policy reasoning.

The state's interest in

informing the public about newsworthy allegations in light of
these considerations favors adoption of the privilege.
2.

California law and cases support adoption of a
Neutral Reportage Privilege.

The California Constitution strikes a balance between
freedom of the press and protection of an individual's
reputation.

"Every person may freely speak, write, and publish

his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the
abuse of this right.

A law may not restrain or abridge liberty

of speech or press."

Cal. Const, art. I, § 2(a)

(West 1996).

California statutes provide a balance between a free press
and protection of individuals' reputations.

See Brown v. Kelly

Broad. Co.. 48 Cal. 3d. 711, 726-27 (1989).

Laws written in the

late 1800's sought to mitigate the harsh per se liability rule
for republishers.

See id.

California Civil Code Section 47

enumerates privileged publications that act as a bar to
liability.

See id.; Cal. Civ. Code § 47 (West Supp. 1997).

At

the same time, the California legislature sought to protect
individuals and, with Civil Code Section 48(a), gave publishers
an incentive to correct any published defamation.

See id.

California courts have interpreted Civil Code Section 47
fairly narrowly.

In Brown, this Court ruled that Section 47 does

not protect the press from private individuals bringing libel
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actions.

48 Cal. 3d. at 726-27.

This Court determined that this

statue, written a century ago, has a narrow reading.

See id.

This Court also noted that protection of publications that
make false statements about private individuals is inconsistent
with Gertz.

See id. at 740.

However, Gertz empowered the states

to set standards for protecting purely private individuals
against libel.

418 U.S. at 347.

This Court should now revisit

the issue and determine to what extent California will privilege
public debate.
Courts in California, both Federal and State, have adopted
the neutral reportage privilege as consistent with protection of
the press.

See, e.a., Barry. 584 F. Supp. at 1124; Weingarten v.

Block, 102 Cal. App. 3d 129, 149 (1980).

The United States

District Court for the Central District of California, in Ward v.
News Group Int’1. Ltd.. 733 F. Supp. 83, 84 (C.D. Cal. 1990),
adopted the neutral reportage privilege without comment.

The

Barry court adopted the privilege after substantial analysis.
584 F. Supp. at 1124.

After reviewing Gertz and other cases from

the United States Supreme Court, the Barry court held that the
neutral reportage privilege is entirely consistent with the New
York Times mandate of encouraging free press and an informed
public.

Id. at 1126.

California state court decisions have also found the
reasoning in Edwards persuasive.

In Weingarten. the court quoted

extensively from Edwards and held that the interest of promoting
an informed public necessitates that the press be able to freely
report on charges others have made without assuming liability for
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the accusations.

102 Cal. App. 3d at 149.

In Grillo v.—S!Ili£Ji» ^

California court again held that the press should not be
responsible for neutrally republishing the accusations of third
parties.

144 Cal. App. 3d 868, 872 (1983).

This Court, in

recognizing a neutral reportage privilege, advances the policies
embodied in California's Constitution, statutes, and court
holdings.

California should, as other jurisdictions have,

maintain a vigorous protection of freedom of the press by
adopting this privilege.
3.

The neutral reportage privilege protects Globe's
neutral and accurate report of the allegations of
another.

Once adopted, the neutral reportage privilege precludes
liability if (1) the allegation is made in relation to a public
figure;

(2) the public figure is involved in a public

controversy;

(3) the defamation relates to the controversy; and

(4) the republication is neutral and accurate.

See Crane v.

Arizona Republic. 729 F. Supp. 698 (C.D. Cal. 1989) .
As demonstrated in Section II, infra, Respondent is a public
figure.

His own voluntary acts are sufficient to place him

within the legal standards developed for a public figure
classification.

Alternatively, the intense media attention given

to this controversy has enveloped the Respondent, making him a
involuntary public figure in relation the Senator Kennedy's
assassination.

Under either of these theories, Respondent is a

public figure and the first element of the privilege is
satisfied.
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The second and third elements require that a public
controversy exist and that the allegations relate to this
See Crane, 729 F. Supp. at 710.

controversy.

Plainly, an

assassination of a political candidate is a public controversy.
Such a controversy relates to democracy, a central facet of
public life.

An allegation that Respondent was the assassin goes

to the heart of this controversy.

The Second Circuit held that

the controversy surrounding the effects on wildlife was a
sufficient controversy to satisfy these elements of the
privilege.

Edwards. 556 F.2d at 113.

The present

controversy is much more central to public life, and plainly
satisfies these elements.
The final element of the privilege requires a neutral and
accurate report.

Crane. 729 F.Supp. at 710.

The Globe

reported the allegations printed in a book after interviewing the
book's author.

(R.T. 1101.)

The report repeatedly cited the

book and attributed the allegations in the book to the author.
(R.T. 1596.)

Every effort to attribute the allegations was made,

and no embellishments to the facts were added.

(R.T. 1596.)

The

report printed in The Globe was neutral and accurate, satisfying
the final element of the test,
A finding that the report is privileged would be consistent
with the spirit of protection of the free press that informs this
privilege.

If the privilege is adopted, it protects Globe's

neutral and accurate report of the allegations of Morrow's book.
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C.

The Privilege of Neutral Reportage Should Apply to Both
Public and Private Figures,

Courts' efforts to classify individuals as private or public
figures demonstrate that such determinations are complex and
difficult.

However, editors are expected to make this

distinction at a moment's notice.
result in extensive liability.

An incorrect judgment can

Rather than assume this risk,

many publishers will self-censor any accusations that are
possibly objectionable.

Ultimately, the public will suffer from

tepid and timid reporting.

This Court should avert this problem

by adopting the neutral reportage privilege, and apply this
privilege to protect the republication of allegations made by
credible sources regarding newsworthy controversies.

Doing so

would privilege Globe's publication of a neutral and accurate
account of allegations made by a prominent source about a
controversy of great public interest.
An Ohio court found the public-private distinction
untenable, holding that the neutral reportage privilege applies
to allegations against both private and public figures.

$eg

April V. Reflector-Herald. Inc.. 546 N,E.2d 456, 469 (Ohio App.
1988) .

In recognizing this privilege, the court reasoned that

informing the public about contentious controversies requires
empowering the press to report accusations made by credible
sources without fear of liability.

See id.

The Barry court

reasoned that the policy imperatives for adopting the neutral
reportage privilege compel adopting the privilege in relation to
both public and private figures.

See Barry, 584 F. Supp. at 1127

(case related to a public figure so the public/private
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distinction issue was never reached).
have reached similar conclusions.
3d at 148.

California state courts

See Weinoarten. 102 Cal, App.

The Weinoarten Court indicated that the logic

underlying the public/private distinction is tenuous at best.

In distinguishing between public and private figures, courts
have required minimal acts for a finding of public figure status.
For example, in Edwards, the persons slandered, although judged
to be public figures, were not public officials and took no
actions to become controversial.

556 F.2d at 113.

The only act

conferring public figure status was the publication of research
articles on the effects of a pesticide.

See id.

Likewise,

federal courts in California found a figure to be public merely
because he once coached a college basketball team.

See Dickey

584 F. Supp. at 1112,
The distinction between public and private figures is
difficult to make in practice.

As seen in Section II, infra. the

courts have fashioned complex, abstract standards to make this
distinction.

Editors must apply these standards to avoid the

risk of sizeable losses in defamation lawsuits.

Unlike the

courts, editors must make their decisions under the pressure of
publication deadlines.

A wrong decision could put a small

publisher out of business.

This forces editors to make

arbitrary, artificial and hasty distinctions.

In practice,

editors will usually decide what to print in light of their
ability to withstand defamation actions.

Large national papers

with lawyers on retainer and deep resources will face few
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constraints on their choice of stories.

In contrast, smaller,

local California papers will be forced to practice self
censorship.

Applying the neutral reportage privilege to both

public and private figures would prevent this situation.
Under this universal neutral reportage privilege, Globe
cannot be found liable for republication of the allegations
concerning Respondent.

The elements of the universal neutral

reportage doctrine are (1) "an allegedly defamatory accusation
must be made by a responsible, prominent" source;

(2)

"the

accusation must concern a matter of public interest"; and (3) the
report of the accusation must be accurate and disinterested, i.e.
the reporter believes the report of the accusation is an accurate
report of the allegations.

April. 546 N.E.2d at 470.

The facts

of this case plainly fit within these elements.
As shown in Section III, infra. Morrow, the author of the
book from which the charges were taken, is a responsible and
prominent source.

The April court did not elucidate the

standards for determining when a source is prominent, instead
finding that a Sheriff in asserting criminal activity was a
prominent source. 546 N.E.2d at 466.

Mr. Morrow is a prominent

author whose first book proposed an international conspiracy for
the death of President John F. Kennedy,

(R.T. 842-43.)

The

allegations of this first book provided the impetus for a
Congressional investigation into President Kennedy's
assassination.

See id.

Mr. Morrow is at least as prominent a

source as the source in April.

Globe was justified in the

32

judgment that the public had a right to know the accusations that
were made by Mr. Morrow,
Senator Kennedy's murder was and continues to be a matter of
public interest.

{R.T. 1601.)

In California, the newsworthiness

of an accusation is determined by considering the societal value
of the facts disclosed, the extent disclosure intrudes into
private affairs, and the extent to which a figure entered the
public arena,

£££ Maheu. 201 Cal. App. 3d at 675.

The Maheu

court held that an alleged affair between millionaire Howard
Hughes and his personal assistant precluded the assistant from
bringing a defamation action.

Id. at 675.

This was found

despite the fact that the assistant never met Hughes and that the
allegations were made more than a decade after the assistant's
employment ended.

See id.

The public is keenly interested in the allegations in the
Globe article.

(R.T. 1601.)

The public interest in the Kennedy

family remains intense, and stories relating to the Kennedy
family continue to be published.

Evan Thomas, The JFK-

MgJ'ilyn Hoax, TIME, Oct. 6, 1997, at 36.

A theory explaining the

assassination of a presidential candidate pertains to the
political process.

Information on such topics lies at the heart

of democracy, defining the integrity of the political process.
Globe was thus justified in ensuring that the public knew about
the controversy.
Globe took every effort to provide a neutral and accurate
report of the contents of Mr. Morrow's book.

(R.T. 1594.)

The

article took all reasonable steps to attribute the accusations to
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the book, referring to the author as the source of the
allegations against Respondent more than a dozen times.
1596.)

(R.T.

Globe has satisfied every element of the privilege and

thus can not be held liable.
D.

Policy Imperatives Support Adopting a Neutral Reportage
Privilege.

In considering where to draw the line in finding liability,
courts give significant consideration to the effects of impeding
a free press.

In the first judicial acceptance of the neutral

reportage privilege, the Edwards court began with the proposition
that "[i]n a society that takes seriously the principle that
government rests upon the consent of the governed, freedom of the
press must be the most cherished tenet."

556 F.2d at 115.

The

court reasoned that to have a truly free press mandated
empowering the press to inform the public about serious charges
that had been leveled by a credible source.

See id.

The court

further reasoned that "what is newsworthy about such accusations
is that they were made" and that even if the reporter doubted the
veracity of the allegations, the public must be informed that
these charges had been made to understand the current
controversy.

See id. at 120.

Furthermore, the Edwards court

found that it was unjust to hold a reporter liable for mere
repetition of possible slander if the reporter did not espouse
the viewpoint of the slanderer.

See id.

However, liability

would attach if the report of the allegations advocated the truth
of the allegations and thus did not remain neutral.
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Set id-

1•

Adoption of a neutral reportage privilege is
consistent with protecting individuals' privacy
and reputation.

As seen in the California Constitution and state statutes,
state law mandates that the state both protect the individual and
secure freedom of the press.
Civ. Code § 48 (West 1986).

Cal, Const, art. I, § 2 (a)

Cal.

However, rather than using

republication liability to effectively silence the press, the
state should employ other, more effective means for protecting an
individual's rights to privacy.
California Civil Code Section 48 is one method of ensuring
protection of an individual's reputation.

This section compels a

party that has been slandered to demand a retraction.
Code § 48 (West 1986).

Cal. Civ.

Newspapers are likely to try to avoid

printing conspicuous retractions by ensuring accurate reporting
in the first instance.

This statute also equalizes the power of

both the private and public individual by ensuring access to the
media.
According to the California Constitution, in addition to
protecting the individual, the state must also strive to maintain
a free press.

in New York Times, the Supreme Court gave

considerable weight to the charge that fear of defamation
liability would have a chilling effect on free speech and would
result in self-censorship of the news.

376 U.S. at 279,

The

need for vigorous public debate mandates adopting the neutral
reportage privilege.
By adopting this privilege in regard to both private and
public figures, this Court could avoid the arbitrary and
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artificial distinction between public and private figures.

The

standards set forth in Gertz for determining whether an
individual is private are based on affirmative acts to enter into
the public arena.

See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351.

This perversely

extends the greatest privacy protection to those who stonewall
the media.

As demonstrated in Section II, infra, distinguishing

public from private status is a Gordian knot.

To further

judicial economy, the Court should eliminate this requirement.
2.

The policy of protecting press sources also
supports adoption of the privilege.

The press' need to rely on credible printed sources for news
supplies another compelling justification for adopting the
neutral reportage privilege.

The vast majority of publications

do not have the resources to independently investigate every
newsworthy story, and must rely upon other printed news sources.
In Lavne v. Tribune Co.. 146 So. 234 (Fla. 1933), the court
refused to hold a newspaper liable for printing an allegedly
defamatory story gathered from a wire service.

Id. at 238.

The

court found that republication of a false statement taken from a
generally recognized reliable source of news could not constitute
libel, absent some finding that the publisher was negligent or
reckless.

See id. at 186,

In recognizing this privilege, the

court acknowledged that if newspapers were not allowed to print
others' published news, many local papers that could not afford
national corespondents would be forced to print only aseptic
"fluff news." See id. at 188.
The privilege for republication from news sources applies
broadly to private persons and non-wire service printed news
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sources.

The Massachusetts Supreme Court refused to hold a

newspaper liable for the republication of a report republishing a
charge against a private person of multiple murders that was sent
out on a wire service.

See Appleby v. Daily Hampshire Gazette.

478 N.E.2d 721, 727 (Mass. 1985).

The court found that holding

the paper responsible for verification of the details of this
story would effectively end the paper's ability to print any news
except local stories.

i^ at 725-26.

A federal district

court likewise held that NEWSWEEK magazine was not liable for
republishing libelous statements gathered from "reliable
periodicals, newspapers, and wire service reports."

Nelson v.

Associated Press. 667 F. Supp. 1468, 1477 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
The freedom of the press is seminal to a functioning
democracy.

However, this freedom will be chilled if Globe is

held liable for republishing the allegations of a noted author.
The press will be forced to censor accurate reports of newsworthy
accusations.

This censorship will occur even if the allegations

have independent informative value.

Additionally, the press

would not be able to rely upon the research of others found in
printed news sources, and would be forced to repeat the research
of other authors.

Editors, at risk for libel liability, would be

forced to restrict the flow of information to the public.

A much

better policy would be to have libel liability rest upon the
source of the defamation.

This provides a recourse to defamed

individuals while still allowing the press to inform the public
about noted controversies.

This policy best serves California.
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CONCLUSION
This court should overturn the finding of the Court of
Appeal and hold that Globe is not liable for accurately
republishing the charges of another.

Mr. Khawar took on the role

of a journalist in a contentious election and thrust himself into
a world of intense media attention, becoming a public figure.
This Court should now remain consistent with the standards for
determining public figure status set in this and other
jurisdictions, and hold that Respondent's actions make him a
limited-purpose public figure.

Because Respondent is a public

figure, Globe cannot be found liable for defamation.
Even if Respondent is found not to be a public figure, he
still must prove actual malice for Globe to be held liable for
punitive damages.

However, the jury's findings and persuasive

legal authority indicates that Respondent has failed to meet the
burden of proving actual malice.
Finally, this Court should adopt the privilege of neutral
reportage as applied to Globe in the present case.

Recognizing

this privilege would protect the free press and is consistent
with United States Supreme Court and state court holdings.

Dated:

November 19, 1997

Respectfully submitted.

Counsel for Petitioner
Globe International, Inc.
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